to the perils of the financial markets, he sees them as the only viable political solution (at least as a supplementary form of provision to the withered state).
It would be invidious for me to attempt to confer a stamp of approval on either account. Because I share much of Engelen's economic analysis and simultaneously accept the logic of Clark's political reasoning, it would also be dishonest. Economically, the evidence that the rich capitalist countries have become financialised is becoming almost overwhelming. Financialisation refers to a situation where the majority of corporate profits are generated through financial engineering rather than through materially productive' activities (Boyer, 2000) . Greta Krippner, for example, has recently carried out a comprehensive empirical analysis of the US case and shown that, not only do financial corporations account for an increasingly large share of profits, but the dominant trajectory for nonfinancial corporations is to rely upon financial engineering. Furthermore, she demonstrates that`f inancialization is not merely an artefact of the stock market mania of the 1990s, but extends back some twenty to thirty years ... the 1990s conform to a pattern of growth in which accumulation across the economy is led by finance'' (2002, page 34, original emphasis). Furthermore, there is evidence that similar patterns are exhibited across the richer capitalist countries (see, for example, Dorre, 2001; Feng et al, 2001; Froud et al, 2000a; 2000b; Jurgens et al, 2000; Morin, 2000; Williams, 2000) . This has important implications for stock-market-based pensions schemes, because the claims pension fund contributors have on the future may be unrealisable. As Arrighi argues,`f inancial expansions have tended to destabilize the existing order through processes that are as much social and political as they are economic. Economically, such expansions systematically divert purchasing power from demand-creating investment in commodities (including labour power) to hoarding and speculation, thereby exacerbating realization problems. Politically, they tend to be associated with the emergence of new configurations of power, which undermine the capacity of the incumbent hegemonic state to turn to its advantage the system-wide intensification of competition. And socially, the massive redistribution of rewards and the social dislocations entailed by financial expansions tend to provoke movements of resistance and rebellion among subordinate groups and strata, whose established ways of life are coming under attack. The form that these tendencies take, and the way in which they relate to one another in space and time, have varied from financial expansion to financial expansion. But some combination of the three tendencies can be detected in each of the two so-far completed hegemonic transitions of historical capitalism öfrom Dutch to British and from British to US hegemony. In the past transitions (although not yet in the current one), they eventually resulted in a complete and seemingly irremediable breakdown in the system's organization, which was not overcome until the system was reconstituted under a new hegemony'' (Arrighi, 2003, page 68) . Even if the somewhat apocalyptic implications of the`Arrighian' analysis of the state of financial markets are overblown (and they may not be), stock-market-based pension schemes are unlikely to be a panacea because theyöjust as much as state pensions ö rely upon an intergenerational wealth transfer: people who buy shares are, effectively, making a claim on the fruits of the labour of workers in the future (because shares entitle the bearer to a portion of future profits). Furthermore, the maturity structure of pension schemes means that there will be the greatest equity withdrawal at the moment of the most demographic stress (Engelen, 2003; Toporowski, 2000) . Other than in the circumstances of the unlimited geographical expansion of capital or an end to financialisation that means that``capital must be allocated in such a way as to enhance productivity gains when the demographic transition has got into full swing'' (Aglietta, 2000, page 157) , it is hard to see how stock markets can resolve the dilemma of how to fund pension schemes.
However, I share Clark's assessment of the political viability of state pension schemes. It is not only in the English-speaking world that collectivist ideals öthat can underwrite a strong social stateöare being eroded (see, for example, Boreus, 1997; Cheru, 2001; Dezalay and Garth, 2002; Hamann, 2001; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Tickell and Peck, 2003; Wade, 1998) . Furthermore, the individualisation of pensions can be an elegant long-term political solutionöalbeit one that may have short-term costsöto governments who have to fight to maintain their political legitimacy. The political risks of failure of a state pensions model are directly attributable to governing parties or, more rarely, the state; whilst the economic risks are likely to be borne by the currently working population. With private provision, however, if pensions fail to meet expectations there is a quiet violenceöretirees will have a lower living standard than anticipated and, in the (extremely plausible) event that stock markets fall rather than rise the economic risk is felt by the recipient. In these circumstances, it is only if there is a fundamental failure of pensions and specific government failures that the crisis of legitimacy is likely to be felt.
My own conclusions are, thus, gloomier than those of either Clark or Engelen, in that my political reasoning is that the state will retreat even as my economic reasoning is that this will be a disaster. Yet these outcomes need not occur and we must beware of naturalising processes that we describe (or decry). Aglietta (2000) , for example, suggests constructive ways of transforming the priorities of pension funds that are commensurate with the analyses of both Clark and Engelen. Ultimately, the future of pensions is about the political and economic decisions that our societies make, and the quality of the political economy of both protagonists here both informs us and should remind us of our wider social and political responsibilities.
